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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The issue we must address on this appeal is whether 
Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act, 77 Pa. Const. 
Stat. Ann. S 531(5) and (6) (West Supp. 1997), which 
provides for the supersedeas of an employee's medical 
benefits without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, 
violates the requisites of procedural due process. We hold 
that it does. Accordingly, we reverse. 
 
I. 
 
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act ("the 
Act"), 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 1 et seq., establishes a 
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compulsory insurance system for employers that provides 
compensation to employees who sustain work-related 
injuries and occupational diseases without regard to an 
employee's negligence. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 431. 
To guarantee the payment of an employee's claims, the Act 
requires employers to obtain insurance -- either through a 
private insurance carrier or through the State Workmen's 
Insurance Fund ("SWIF ") -- or to self-insure. See id. S 501. 
When an employer purchases insurance, the insurance 
company assumes the employer's statutory liabilities. See 
id. SS 501, 701. 
 
On July 2, 1993, the Pennsylvania legislature amended 
the Act by enacting Act 44. The purpose of Act 44 was to 
contain the spiraling costs of medical treatment for work- 
related injuries. Codified at 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. 
S 531(5) and (6), Act 44 created a utilization review process 
under which the reasonableness and/or necessity of an 
employee's medical treatment could be reviewed. It is these 
provisions of Act 44 which create the utilization review 
process and the corresponding supersedeas that are 
challenged in this action. Utilization review is a process 
whereby medical providers assess the reasonableness or 
necessity of current, prospective, or past medical treatment. 
 
Section 531(5) provides the mechanism by which 
utilization review is invoked. It states in pertinent part: 
 
       The employer or insurer shall make payment and 
       providers shall submit bills and records in accordance 
       with the provisions of this section. All payments to 
       providers for treatment provided pursuant to this act 
       shall be made within thirty (30) days of receipt of such 
       bills and records unless the employer or insurer 
       disputes the reasonableness or necessity of the 
       treatment provided pursuant to paragraph (6) . . . . 
 
77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(5) (West 1997) (emphasis 
added). Hence, an employer or insurer must pay an 
employee's medical expenses within thirty (30) days of 
receipt of the medical bills unless the employer or insurer 
requests utilization review. The decision to invoke 
utilization review is made independently by the employer or 
insurer. 
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A. 
 
Section 531(6) outlines the utilization review process. 
Section 531(6) provides: 
 
       . . . disputes as to reasonableness or necessity of 
       treatment by a health care provider shall be resolved in 
       accordance with the following provisions: 
 
       (I) The reasonableness or necessity of all treatment 
       provided by a health care provider under this act may 
       be subject to prospective, concurrent or retrospective 
       utilization review at the request of an employe[sic], 
       employer or insurer. The department shall authorize 
       utilization review organizations to perform utilization 
       review under this act. Utilization review of all treatment 
       rendered by a health care provider shall be performed 
       by a provider licensed in the same profession and 
       having the same or similar specialty as that of the 
       provider of the treatment under review. Organizations 
       not authorized by the department may not engage in 
       such utilization review. 
 
       (ii) The utilization review organization shall issue a 
       written report of its findings and conclusions within 
       thirty (30) days of a request. 
 
       (iii) The employer or the insurer shall pay the cost of 
       the utilization review. 
 
       (iv) If the provider, employer, employe [sic] or insurer 
       disagrees with the finding of the utilization review 
       organization, a petition for review by the department 
       must be filed within thirty (30) days after receipt of the 
       report. The department shall assign the petition to a 
       workers' compensation judge for a hearing or for an 
       informal conference under [77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. 
       S 711.1]. The utilization review report shall be part of 
       the record before the workers' compensation judge. The 
       workers' compensation judge shall consider the 
       utilization review report as evidence but shall not be 
       bound by the report. 
 
77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(6). 
 
Thus, utilization review is invoked when an employee, 
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employer, or insurer requests review of specific medical 
treatment performed.1 The party seeking review submits its 
request to the Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("the 
Bureau") on a Bureau-prescribed form entitled "Utilization 
Review: Initial Request" ("Initial Request"). The Bureau 
reviews the Initial Request to ensure that it is properly 
completed -- i.e., that all information required by the form 
is provided. See 34 Pa. Code S 127.452. The Bureau's 
review of the Initial Request does not address the legitimacy 
or lack thereof of the request for utilization review. 
 
If the Initial Request is improperly completed (i.e., does 
not provide all pertinent information requested by the 
form), the Bureau denies the request for review and sends 
the form back to the party. If the Initial Request is 
completed properly, the request is approved and the party 
requesting review must serve a copy of the Initial Request 
upon the remaining interested parties, including the 
employee, the employer, the insurer, and the health care 
provider, as appropriate. See 34 Pa. Code S 127.452. 
 
At this point, according to the Act's regulations, an 
employer or insurer with a Bureau-approved request may 
suspend payment for the medical treatment in question. 
See id. S 127.208.2 The Act does not require -- but permits 
-- suspension of medical benefits. In addition, medical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. An employee is not likely to request utilization review, however, 
because the invocation of that process can result in the termination of 
the employee's medical benefits pending such review. 
 
2. Section 127.208 of the regulations pertinent to the Act provides in 
part: 
 
       (e) The 30-day period in which payment shall be made to the 
       provider may be tolled only if review of the reasonableness or 
       necessity of the treatment is requested during the 30-day period 
       under the UR provisions . . . . The insurer's right to suspend 
       payment shall continue throughout both the initial review and the 
       reconsideration review of the UR process. The insurer's right to 
       suspend payment shall further continue beyond the UR process to 
       a proceeding before a Workers' Compensation judge, unless there is 
       a UR determination made at reconsideration that the treatment is 
       reasonable or necessary. 
 
34 Pa. Code S 127.208(e) (1996). 
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providers are not forbidden from continuing to furnish 
medical services to employees who are subjected to such 
review, although any such treatment is rendered with the 
risk that the medical provider ultimately may not be 
compensated depending upon the resolution of the 
utilization review. Furthermore, although the employee is 
given notice that the Initial Request for utilization review 
has been filed, there is no indication on that form that an 
employee's medical benefits may be terminated for and 
during the disputed treatment. Further, the Initial Request 
does not provide any information or explanation regarding 
what utilization review entails. 
 
After a request for review is properly filed, the Bureau 
randomly assigns the case to a Utilization Review 
Organization ("URO"),3 and the Bureau again notifies all 
interested parties that the case has been assigned by 
sending out a Notice of Assignment form. See 34 Pa. Code 
S 127.453. The Notice of Assignment is a copy of the notice 
that is sent to the URO, advising the URO that a particular 
case has been assigned to it. The Notice of Assignment, like 
the Initial Request, does not inform employees that their 
medical benefits may be suspended nor does it advise 
employees of procedures under which their suspension may 
be protested. 
 
The review process is narrowly tailored to the task of 
determining whether specific medical treatment is or was 
reasonable or necessary. Utilization review is conducted by 
a health care provider4 who has "the same or similar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "Utilization Review Organizations" are defined as 
 
       those organizations consisting of an impartial physician, surgeon 
or 
       other health care provider or a panel of such professionals and 
       provides as authorized . . . for the purpose of reviewing the 
       reasonableness and necessity of a health care provider pursuant to 
       section 531(6). 
 
77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 29 (West 1997). 
 
4. A "health care provider" is defined as 
 
       any person, corporation, facility or institution licensed or 
otherwise 
       authorized by the Commonwealth to provide health care services, 
       including, but not limited to, any physician, coordinated care 
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specialty" as the provider who conducted the treatment in 
question. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(6)(i). 
Accordingly, the reviewer must apply generally accepted 
treatment protocols to assess the reasonableness or 
necessity of the questioned treatment. See 34 Pa. Code 
S 127.467. The URO may not request, seek, or obtain 
independent medical examinations or reports. See id. 
S 127.461. Rather, the review is solely based upon the 
medical records of the treating medical provider and any 
discussions that the URO has had with the medical 
provider concerning the treatment. See id. SS 127.461, 
127.469.5 Lastly, the URO's role is narrowly defined to 
address exclusively whether the medical treatment in 
question is reasonable and/or necessary. See 34 Pa. Code 
S 127.470. 
 
The URO must assume that the employee's medical 
condition is a work-related injury. See id. In addition, the 
URO does not consider whether the employee is still 
disabled, whether the employee has obtained maximum 
medical improvement, or whether the fees charged are 
reasonable. As noted, the URO's exclusive function is to 
determine the reasonableness or necessity of the prescribed 
treatment in question. 
 
The URO must issue a report of its findings and 
conclusions within thirty (30) days of a request. 6 See 77 Pa. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       organization, hospital, health care facility, dentist, nurse, 
       optometrist, podiatrist, physical therapist, psychologist, 
chiropractor 
       or pharmacist and an officer, employe [sic] or agent of such person 
       acting in the course and scope of employment or agency related to 
       health care services. 
 
77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 29. 
 
5. The URO must give the treating medical provider an opportunity to 
discuss the challenged treatment. See 34 Pa. Code S 127.469. Neither 
the statute nor the regulations make any provision for giving the affected 
employee the same opportunity. 
 
6. The regulations provide that the URO must complete the review and 
make a determination within thirty (30) days of receiving the medical 
provider's records or within thirty-five (35) days of the date that the 
URO 
received the Notice of Assignment, whichever is earlier. See 34 Pa. Code 
S 127.465. 
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Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(6)(ii). The written report must 
contain findings, conclusions, and citations to generally 
accepted treatment protocols and medical literature, as 
appropriate. See 34 Pa. Code S 127.472. The URO sends 
the report to the Bureau which then sends a copy to all 
interested parties. See id. S 127.476. The employer or 
insurer pays for the initial utilization review. See 77 Pa. 
Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(6)(iii); 34 Pa. CodeS 127.477. 
 
B. 
 
Originally, Act 44 permitted reconsideration of the URO's 
determination if filed within thirty (30) days of the URO's 
report. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(6)(iv). The review 
on reconsideration mirrored the initial utilization review 
except that a different URO conducted the review and the 
Bureau advanced the costs of reconsideration and 
subsequently billed the losing party. See 34 Pa. Code 
S 127.514. Thus, as with the utilization review, an employee 
could not testify before a URO concerning the medical 
treatment on reconsideration. Further, parties were not 
notified before invoking reconsideration review that they 
would be billed for the costs of reconsideration review if 
they lost. 
 
If a party disagreed with the URO's determination on 
reconsideration, it could file a Petition for Review with the 
Bureau for de novo review before a Workers' Compensation 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). If the employee prevailed 
upon reconsideration, the supersedeas was lifted pending 
this de novo hearing. If the employee lost the 
reconsideration review, the supersedeas remained in effect. 
See id. S 127.208(f). 
 
Even if the medical services provided were ultimately 
found to be reasonable and/or necessary, an employee's 
benefits could be suspended for a considerable length of 
time pending the initial utilization review, reconsideration, 
and de novo review by an ALJ. While the Act requires the 
initial utilization review to occur within thirty (30) days of 
a request, see 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(5)(ii), and 
reconsideration to be filed within thirty (30) days of the 
URO's determination and decided within 30-35 days 
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thereafter, see 34 Pa. Code S 127.508, there is no time- 
frame specified for adjudication and resolution before the 
ALJ. Accordingly, employees could have waited months or 
even years without medical benefits before the 
reasonableness or necessity of their treatment was resolved. 
 
In 1996, the Act was amended yet again by Act 57. Act 
57 streamlined the utilization review process by eliminating 
the reconsideration process, thereby allowing for faster de 
novo review by an ALJ. Thus, after the initial URO issues 
its decision, the losing party no longer need seek 
reconsideration by another URO, but rather may petition 
for de novo review by an ALJ. Under Act 57, if the initial 
URO rules in favor of the employee, the supersedeas is 
lifted pending the ALJ's review. If the URO rules against the 
employee, the supersedeas remains in effect until after the 
ALJ renders his/her decision. See id. S 127.208(e). In all 
other material respects the provisions of Act 44 remained in 
effect and are not challenged here. 
 
II. 
 
The Plaintiffs (hereinafter, collectively "Sullivan") in the 
present S 1983 case are ten individual employees7 and two 
organizations representing employees who claim that their 
medical benefits were suspended without regard to due 
process: the Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational 
Safety and Health ("PhilaPOSH"),8  and the Philadelphia 
Federation of Teachers ("PFT").9  Sullivan claims that the 
amendments to the Act violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional 
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Plaintiffs-Appellants are Delores Scott Sullivan, William Battle, 
Louis Baumgartner, Anthony Cancila, William C. Dillon, Terrence Ervine, 
Charles Matthews, Christopher Costello, Lisa Lex, and Susan Hansen. 
 
8. PhilaPOSH is a non-profit organization comprised of over 2000 unions 
and individual members, representing approximately 300,000 workers in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania. PhilaPOSH advocates for occupational safety 
and the rights of injured workers. Plaintiffs alleged that several members 
of PhilaPOSH had been directly affected by the utilization review 
procedures challenged in this litigation. See Am. Compl. at P 15. 
 
9. In its order dated March 30, 1995, the district court permitted the PFT 
to intervene as a plaintiff in this action. 
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permitting their employers and/or insurers to suspend the 
payment of their workers' compensation medical benefits 
without prior notice and without affording them an 
opportunity to be heard.10 Sullivan filed the amended 
complaint in this action on May 21, 1996, three months 
before the amendments in Act 57 rescinding 
reconsideration review took effect. 
 
The Defendants in this action include various state 
officials responsible for administering the Act ("the 
Commonwealth Defendants"),11 the director of SWIF,12 the 
School District of Philadelphia ("the School District"), and 
several insurance companies.13 
 
The insurance company defendants and the School 
District moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds 
that there was no state action involved in suspending 
Sullivan's medical benefits.14 Sullivan filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue that the insurers 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and 
       subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States 
       and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
       any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens 
       of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, 
       liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
       person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S 1. 
 
11. The state officials are the Secretary of Labor and Industry, Robert 
Barnett (Appellees name Johnny Butler in this position); Director of 
Pennsylvania's Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Richard Himler; 
Insurance Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Linda 
Kaiser; and Treasurer for the Commonwealth, Catherine Baker Knoll. 
 
12. The Director of SWIF is Ralph Chase. 
 
13. The insurance companies involved in this action are American 
Manufacturer's Mutual Insurance Company, Cigna Corporation, 
Continental Casualty Company, USF&G Insurance Company, and Zurich 
American Insurance Company. 
 
14. The insurance company defendants contended that there was no 
state action with respect to the private decisions that they made. The 
School District claimed that there was no state action because it did not 
participate in the decision-making process concerning the invocation of 
utilization review (and corresponding termination of medical benefits) 
because it contracted out the payment of its medical liabilities under the 
Act to a private company which is not a party to the present action. See 
Sch. Dist.'s Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 1-4 (district court docket 
# 11, 12). 
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and the School District were state actors subject to the 
constraints of due process. In its opinion and order dated 
January 24, 1996, the district court ruled that the private 
insurers were not state actors, but at that time did not 
decide the state action issue with respect to the School 
District as the record was incomplete and more discovery 
was needed. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 913 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996) (hereinafter, "Sullivan I"). 
 
On May 28, 1996, Sullivan moved for class certification 
to represent the class of workers who have had or will have 
their medical benefits suspended under Pennsylvania's 
utilization review procedures without advance notice or an 
opportunity to be heard prior to supersedeas of benefits 
under section 531(5) and (6). See Am. Compl. at P 17. 
Holding that the supersedeas provisions did not offend due 
process, the district court dismissed the complaint with 
respect to the Commonwealth Defendants and the School 
District by orders dated November 7, 1996, see Sullivan v. 
Butler, 1996 WL 654032 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1996) 
(hereinafter, "Sullivan II"), and December 13, 1996, 
respectively, without certifying the plaintiff-class. This 
appeal followed. 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. Our review over the district court's rulings is 
plenary. See Weiner v. The Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 
315 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
III. 
 
In order for Sullivan to prevail on her claims that the Act 
does not provide adequate notice nor an opportunity to be 
heard before her benefits are terminated, the Defendants 
must be held to be state actors or to be acting under color 
of state law.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to individuals who have been 
deprived of a federal right by a person acting "under color of state law." 
See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). 
The "under color of state law" requirement ofS 1983 and the "state 
action" element of the Fourteenth Amendment have been interpreted to 
be "identical in most contexts," Id. at 639 n.15; see also Lugar, 457 U.S. 
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The Commonwealth does not dispute that it is a state 
actor, and indeed, it would be hard-pressed to do so in light 
of the fact that it was the Commonwealth that enacted the 
supersedeas provisions of 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(5) 
and (6) which deprive Sullivan of the Workers' 
Compensation medical benefits to which she is entitled. Nor 
has SWIF disputed the fact that it is a state actor. See 
Commonwealth Br. at 20 n.12; see also Rumph v. State 
Workmen's Ins. Fund, 964 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1997); 
Baksalary v. Smith, 579 F. Supp. 218, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
Further, the School District apparently does not now 
contest that it is a state actor, as it has not briefed the 
issue on appeal.16 The insurers, however, deny that their 
actions in invoking relief under the supersedeas provisions 
appurtenant to the utilization review process constitute 
state action. We cannot agree. 
 
State action has been characterized as one of the most 
troublesome issues of constitutional law. See Henry C. 
Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist 
Court, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 587, 588 (1991). Various 
cases have led to differing results in factual scenarios that, 
at least upon first impression, appear to be similar. 
Compare Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 
1995) (concluding that state action existed in context of 
volunteer fire department), with Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that state 
action did not attach to actions of a volunteer first aid 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
at 935 n.18. Thus, private parties can be held liable for the alleged due 
process violations only if "it can be fairly said that the [government] is 
responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains" -- 
here, the suspension of employees' Workers' Compensation medical 
benefits. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004) 
(1982). 
 
16. In Sullivan I, the district court initially denied the School 
District's 
motion to dismiss premised upon the state action issue. See Sullivan I, 
913 F. Supp. at 905. However, because the district court held that the 
supersedeas provisions of the Act did not violate procedural due process 
in Sullivan II, the district court did not ultimately find it necessary to 
reach the state action issue with respect to the School District. 
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squad). Indeed, the state action inquiry necessarily depends 
upon the factual contexts in which the controversies arise. 
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); 
Jackson v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 
(1961) ("Only by sifting through facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State 
in private conduct be attributed its true significance."); 
Groman, 47 F.3d at 639 n.16. To compound the confusion 
surrounding a state action examination, courts have 
employed various tests and standards that have been 
anything but a model of clarity. See Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J. 
dissenting) ("Unfortunately, [Supreme Court] cases deciding 
when private action might be deemed that of the state have 
not been a model of consistency."). 
 
In order to analyze the state action issue before us, it is 
critical to place the insurer's role within the Workers' 
Compensation system in its proper context. The Act 
provides no-fault compensation to all employees within the 
Commonwealth for all injuries sustained during the course 
of one's employment. In exchange for this guarantee of 
automatic compensation for wage loss and medical costs 
without regard to proof or fault, employees lost their right 
to sue their employers in tort. See Winterberg v. 
Transportation Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 1995). The Act 
abolishes an employer's common law defenses and strips 
an employee of his/her right to sue upon common law 
causes of action. Thus, the Workmen's Compensation 
scheme in Pennsylvania has been held to be the exclusive 
remedy available to an injured worker. See 77 Pa. Const. 
Stat. Ann. S 481(a).17 Cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. 
DiBartolo, 131 F.3d 343, 350-51 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding an 
employer's voluntary purchase of uninsured motorist 
coverage is a fringe benefit since it is no longer mandated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 481(a) states, in pertinent part: 
 
       The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and 
in 
       the place of any and all other liability to such employes [sic] . . 
. or 
       anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or 
       otherwise on account of any injury or death . . . . 
 
77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 481(a) (West 1992). 
 
                                17 
  
by state law and, thus, is not subject to the exclusivity 
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act). The system 
is mandatory; an employee cannot opt-out of Pennsylvania 
Workers' Compensation scheme. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. 
Ann. S 461 (historical notes). 
 
The benefits provided to employees under the Act are a 
constitutionally protected entitlement. None of the parties 
disputes this. See, e.g., Sullivan II at 4; see also Baksalary, 
579 F. Supp. at 224-225. The Commonwealth has created 
this entitlement, and the Commonwealth guarantees that 
these benefits will be paid to an injured employee.18 
 
In creating and executing this system of entitlements, the 
Commonwealth has enacted a complex and interwoven 
regulatory web enlisting the Bureau, the employers, and 
the insurance companies. The Commonwealth extensively 
regulates and controls the Workers' Compensation system. 
Although the insurance companies are private entities, 
when they act under the construct of the Workers' 
Compensation system, they are providing public benefits 
which honor State entitlements. In effect, they become an 
arm of the State, fulfilling a uniquely governmental 
obligation under an entirely state-created, self-contained 
public benefit system. It is a "system which the government 
alone administers." Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622. Thus, we 
conclude the insurance companies are a partner or an arm 
of the State in implementing legislation that administers 
constitutionally protected entitlements which the 
Commonwealth has enacted as a matter of policy. 
 
The right to invoke the supersedeas, or to stop payments, 
is a power that traditionally was held in the hands of the 
State. When insurance companies invoke the supersedeas 
(i.e., suspension) of an employee's medical benefits, they 
compromise an employee's State-created entitlements. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The Commonwealth guarantees that Workmen's Compensation 
benefits will be paid by imposing a statutory obligation upon the 
employer to pay for all work-related injuries of his/her employees. If the 
employer's insurance company becomes insolvent, however, the Workers' 
Compensation Security Fund, a fund administered and created by the 
Commonwealth, assumes the responsibility of paying the benefits to 
eligible employees. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 1053. 
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insurers have no power to deprive or terminate such 
benefits without the permission and participation of the 
Commonwealth. More importantly, however, the 
Commonwealth is intimately involved in any decision by an 
insurer to terminate an employee's constitutionally 
protected benefits because an insurer cannot suspend 
medical payments without first obtaining authorization 
from the Bureau. However this authorization may be 
characterized, any deprivation that occurs is predicated 
upon the State's involvement. 
 
There is little difference between the approval required 
here and that necessary for utilizing a peremptory 
challenge, see, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622, or for 
employing a nonclaim statute with the assistance of the 
probate court. See, e.g., Tulsa Prof 'l Collection Serv. v. Pope, 
485 U.S. 478 (1988). "The [Bureau] is intimately involved 
throughout, and without that involvement" the supersedeas 
could not operate. Id. at 487. Further, the supersedeas 
lacks the self-executing characteristic that might otherwise 
render due process concerns irrelevant. To the contrary, the 
supersedeas provisions at issue are not self-executing, and 
without the Commonwealth's involvement and approval, the 
insurance companies would be precluded from suspending 
medical benefit payments -- an aspect of the Workmen's 
Compensation procedure which they had desired. 
Accordingly, we hold that the private insurance companies 
are state actors when they invoke the supersedeas 
provisions under S 531(5) and (6). 
 
Our decision is consistent with West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 
42 (1988). There, the Court held that a private physician 
under contract with the State of North Carolina to provide 
medical services to prison inmates acted under color of 
state law even though the doctor was not directly employed 
by the State. In West, the State was under an affirmative 
obligation to provide medical care to inmates. The State 
delegated that responsibility to a part-time contract 
physician, who assumed the State's obligation. Under these 
circumstances, the Court held that state action attached to 
the actions of the private doctor such that the prisoner 
could maintain a S 1983 cause of action against the doctor. 
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That the doctor exercised professional judgment and 
discretion independent of the State was insufficient to 
relieve him of his constitutional obligations. See id. at 52. 
The Court emphasized that "[i]t is the physician's function 
within the state system, not the precise terms of his 
employment, that determines whether his action can fairly 
be attributed to the State." Id. at 55-56. "[T]he dispositive 
issue concerns the relationship among the State, the 
physician, and the prisoner." Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, in this case, examining the relationship among 
the Commonwealth, employer, and the insurance 
companies, we have concluded that the actions of the 
insurers constitute state action. The employers are under 
an affirmative obligation to insure their employees for work- 
related accidents. This obligation is expressly assumed by 
the insurance companies when an employer purchases 
insurance, see 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. SS 501, 701, and is 
assumed by the Commonwealth if and when a insurer 
becomes insolvent.19 Like the constitutional right involved 
in West, the employees under the Act have a 
constitutionally protected entitlement in receiving their 
Workers' Compensation medical benefits. In addition, like 
the prisoner in West, the employees cannot elect to go 
outside the system for medical treatment. Like prisoners, 
they are locked into the system, and any relief that the 
employees obtain is strictly through the program which the 
State has designed. The employees are, in essence, 
prisoners -- albeit beneficiaries -- of the Commonwealth's 
Workers' Compensation system. 
 
Our conclusion is also consistent with the decision of the 
three-judge district court panel which convened in 
Baksalary v. Smith,20 579 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. See supra note 17. 
 
20. In Baksalary, a three-judge panel of the district court comprised of 
two district court judges and one Court of Appeals judge, convened 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2284. In Baksalary, employees contested an 
automatic supersedeas provision under the Act that terminated an 
employee's benefits without notice or a pre-termination opportunity to be 
heard. If an employer or insurer filed a petition which alleged that an 
employee had returned to work at the same or higher rate of pay, or if 
the petition -- accompanied by a physician's affidavit -- alleged that the 
employee had recovered from his/her disability, then the employer or 
insurer could terminate the employee's Workers' Compensation benefits. 
See Baksalary, 579 F. Supp. at 221. 
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which held that the state action mantle falls upon the 
insurers. Baksalary involved a similar challenge to the Act, 
held that the insurers acted under color of state law, and 
accordingly found that there had been a denial of due 
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment from the 
invocation of section 413, 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann.S 774, a 
similar supersedeas provision. 
 
We are aware that Baksalary has been criticized by the 
Fifth Circuit in Barnes v. Legman, 861 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 
1988), but we do not share the Fifth Circuit's view. Barnes 
concerned a due process challenge to a provision in Texas' 
Workers' Compensation Statute that permitted an 
insurance carrier to terminate medical benefits based upon 
a medical report. As the Barnes decision is predicated upon 
its interpretation of Texas -- as distinct from Pennsylvania 
-- law, it is necessarily inapposite to this case. The Barnes 
court did not explain in detail the procedural involvement 
of Texas in permitting the insurance company to deny an 
employee his/her benefits. Clearly, however, the statutory 
provision permitting the termination of benefits in Barnes 
and the supersedeas provisions at issue here vary 
significantly. In Barnes, for instance, the insurance 
company was not compelled to resume the employee's 
benefits even after a State officer reviewing the case 
recommended that the insurance company reinstate those 
benefits. See Barnes, 861 F.2d at 1384. Thus, the employee 
was left with a cause of action under state law only. 
 
In addition, it is unclear whether employers and/or 
employees can opt-out of Texas' Workers' Compensation 
scheme. In Pennsylvania, as we have stated, they cannot. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it is not clear that 
under Texas law that State involvement was required prior 
to the termination of benefits. See Tex. Workers' 
Compensation Law, art. 8307 S 11 (repealed 1989).21 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Article 8307, S 11, provides: 
 
       Association suspending payments. When the association suspends 
       or stops payment of compensation, it shall immediately notify the 
       board of that fact, giving the board the name, number and style of 
       the claim, the amount paid thereon, the date of the suspension or 
       stopping of payment thereon, and the reason for such suspension or 
       stopping. 
 
Tex. Workers' Compensation Law, art. 8307, S 11 (repealed 1989). 
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Nor do we find other state action authorities to be 
persuasive in analyzing the context of Pennsylvania's 
Workmen's Compensation statutory scheme. As we have 
previously observed, the factual context in which the 
particular issue arises must be the focus of a state action 
inquiry. Other cases cited by the insurers such as Blum v. 
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (finding no state action when 
private nursing homes decided to transfer or discharge 
Medicaid patients without notice or a hearing), Rendell- 
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (finding no state action 
when private school fired employees despite the fact that 
school was financed from almost exclusively public sources 
and was extensively regulated by government), Flagg 
Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (finding no state 
action when private warehouseman invoked self-help 
provisions of New York's Uniform Commercial Code by 
selling goods entrusted to him), and Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (finding no state 
action when privately owned electric utility terminated a 
customer's electric service for nonpayment without a 
hearing), do not, by the very nature of the controversies 
with which they dealt, involve a comprehensive statutory 
scheme similar to that present in this case. 
 
We therefore conclude that, in the present context of a 
comprehensive state scheme reflected in the Workers' 
Compensation statute of Pennsylvania, the private insurers 
are state actors. The Act mandates compliance by 
employers, employees, and insurance companies and 
inextricably entangles the insurance companies in a 
partnership with the Commonwealth such that they become 
an integral part of the state in administering the statutory 
scheme. This relationship more than suffices to satisfy the 
constitutional requisites under the tests -- varied though 
they may be -- for state action. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 
(state action exists if the State has coerced the action or 
provided significant encouragement); Rendell-Baker, 457 
U.S. at 842 (state action exists if there is a symbiotic 
relationship between the state and the private actor); Flagg 
Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-59 (state action exists if private actor 
exercises powers exclusively within the prerogative of the 
State); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (state action exists if a 
sufficiently close nexus between State and private actor is 
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found); Mark, 51 F.3d at 1156 (suggesting courts should 
employ a totality of circumstances approach to state action 
inquiries) (Greenberg, J. concurring). We expressly limit our 
holding here today, however, to the unique context in which 
the instant supersedeas provisions arise.22 
 
IV. 
 
We now address the due process issue that is at the 
heart of the instant action. 
 
The gravamen of Sullivan's complaint is that the lack of 
notice afforded under the supersedeas provisions, S 531(5) 
and (6), of the Act violates the procedural due process 
guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
neither the Initial Request for utilization review nor the 
Notice of Assignment specifically informs an employee that 
the insurer or employer can stop paying for the contested 
medical treatments pending review.23 Although employees 
are notified that their employers or insurers have invoked 
the utilization review process pursuant to 34 Pa. Code 
S 127.452, or are notified that the case has been assigned 
for review to a URO, pursuant to 34 Pa. Code S 127.453(b), 
Sullivan points out that such notification does not provide 
any information or explanation concerning what the 
utilization review process involves. Sullivan also contends 
that neither notification provides any information about 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. In light of our holding that the private insurance companies are state 
actors and are thus bound by the constraints of due process, we need 
not address the question as to whether a disparate classification 
concerning a public insurer, such as SWIF, and the private insurers 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
23. Neither party disputes the district court's ruling that Workers' 
Compensation benefits are a constitutionally protected property interest 
subject to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Sullivan II at 4; see also Baksalary v. Smith, 579 
F. Supp. 218, 224-25 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("We find that when an individual 
must forego the use of his [workers'] compensation benefits for as long 
as one year . . . that individual has undergone the deprivation of a 
constitutionally protected property interest."). Accordingly, we 
concentrate upon whether the procedures afforded to employees under 
the Act comport with the strictures of due process. 
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how an employee can contest the underlying allegations 
that serve the basis for the utilization review. Accordingly, 
Sullivan argues that such notification is defective because 
(1) the employee receives no notice that his/her benefits 
may cease pending review, (2) the employee receives no 
meaningful notice prior to the deprivation, and (3) the 
employee is not advised of the procedures under which 
he/she can protest the imminent deprivation. 
 
The Bureau does not dispute that no notice is provided 
to an employee that his/her medical benefits might be 
suspended. Rather, the Bureau contends that the decision 
to discontinue such benefits (i.e., request a supersedeas) is 
discretionary and is determined solely by the employer or 
the insurer, not the Bureau. Thus, the Bureau maintains 
that it does not have information regarding the status of an 
employees' medical benefits in a utilization review case, and 
accordingly it does not deny employees of procedural due 
process by failing to notify them of such information. The 
Bureau further asserts that this case is not akin to 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 306, 314 (1970), 24 such that a 
pre-deprivation hearing is required prior to the suspension 
of medical benefits. As a result, the Bureau maintains that 
sufficient process is afforded to employees under the Act. 
 
"The core of due process is the right to notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard." LaChance v. Erickson, 
___ U.S. ___, 1998 WL 17107 (1998) at 3; see also 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 
(1985); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft , 436 U.S. 
1, 13 (1978); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313 (1950). We will thus address the constitutionality of the 
pre-deprivation notice the employees receive in this case 
and their opportunity to be heard, in turn. 
 
A. Notice 
 
"[A]dequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed 
termination" of a constitutionally protected liberty or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that a pre-deprivation 
evidentiary hearing was required prior to the termination of welfare 
benefits. 
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property interest must be afforded to individuals prior to 
the deprivation. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 
(1970). Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. The 
level of notice required before an individual is deprived of a 
constitutionally protected property interest depends upon 
the particular benefits at issue. "[D]ue process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972). 
 
In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, the Supreme 
Court held that a Memphis utility company did not provide 
constitutionally sufficient notice to its customers prior to 
terminating their utilities. Although the utility gave its 
customers notice that their service could be terminated for 
nonpayment of their bill, the company failed to inform its 
patrons of how they could protest or object to charges on 
their bills. The Court concluded that "[n]otice in a case of 
this kind does not comport with constitutional 
requirements when it does not advise the customer of the 
availability of a procedure for protesting a proposed 
termination . . . as unjustified." 436 U.S. at 14-15 (emphasis 
added). 
 
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court considered whether the 
notice provisions of New York City's welfare termination 
process comported with due process. As welfare recipients 
were given seven days advance notice of the impending 
termination, a letter informing them of the precise 
questions raised about their continued eligibility and the 
legal and factual bases for the Department of Social 
Services' doubts, and a personal conference explaining the 
same, the Court held that the notice provisions were 
adequate. See 397 U.S. at 268. Similarly, although notice 
was not directly at issue in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 324 (1976), the Court acknowledged that recipients of 
Social Security disability payments were afforded proper 
notice which included a letter informing them that their 
benefits would be terminated prior to the deprivation, a 
detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed 
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termination, and the opportunity to submit additional 
evidence to the agency making the determination prior to 
the actual deprivation. 
 
Moreover, we held in Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889 (3d 
Cir. 1986), that the notice provided by Delaware prior to the 
termination or denial of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, Food Stamps, and Medicaid benefits was 
constitutionally deficient because it failed to explain the 
reasons for the state agency's action and did not contain 
the agency's specific calculations utilizing an employee's 
income or financial resources to ascertain his/her eligibility 
in making its determination. See id. at 892, 895. 
 
The Supreme Court of Iowa confronted a similar problem 
to the one at hand when it considered the notice to which 
an employee was entitled before his/her Workers' 
Compensation benefits were terminated. There, the Court 
held that at a minimum due process required the following: 
 
       (1) the contemplated termination, 
       (2) that the termination of benefits was to occur at a 
       specified time not less than 30 days after notice, 
       (3) the reason or reasons for the termination, 
       (4) that the recipient had the opportunity to submit 
       any evidence or documents disputing or 
       contradicting the reasons given for termination, 
       and, if such evidence or documents are submitted, 
       to be advised whether termination is still 
       contemplated, 
       (5) that the recipient had the right to petition for 
       review. 
 
Auxier v. Woodward State Hospital-School, 266 N.W.2d 139, 
142-43 (Iowa 1978). 
 
Informed by established precedent, we hold that in the 
case of terminating the medical benefits of a workers' 
compensation employee, at a minimum due process 
requires that employees receive notice that includes (1) 
timely notification that their medical benefits might cease 
prior to the deprivation, (2) an explanation of the reasons 
for the proposed termination, (3) an opportunity to respond 
to the accusations alleged, and (4) information advising 
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them of the availability of the procedures that they may 
utilize to protest the proposed termination. 
 
In the instant case, the notice that an employee receives 
prior to the termination of his/her medical benefits is 
constitutionally inadequate. While the employee is notified 
by the Initial Request that utilization review has been 
invoked and the reasons upon which the utilization review 
is based, the Initial Request does not explain that a 
supersedeas or suspension of one's medical benefits may 
result nor does it explain what utilization review entails. In 
addition, it does not inform an employee of any procedures 
under which the employee can protest the suspension of 
the medical benefits or contest the merits on which the 
proposed deprivation is based. 
 
Similarly, the Notice of Assignment does not cure any of 
the above notice deficiencies. The Notice of Assignment is, 
in fact, a copy of the notice to the URO informing the URO 
that a particular case has been assigned. Like the Initial 
Request, the Notice of Assignment does not notify an 
employee that his/her medical benefits may be terminated 
nor does it advise an employee of any procedures under 
which such termination may be challenged. Further, by the 
time the Notice of Assignment is received, the employees' 
medical benefits may have already been suspended, as the 
supersedeas can be invoked and thus a suspension of 
benefits effected upon the proper filing of the utilization 
review process. 
 
That an employee's medical benefits may be suspended 
prior to his/her receiving notice of that termination is 
constitutionally fatal to S 531(5) and (6) under the strictures 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) ("Procedural 
due process rules are meant to protect persons not from 
the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.") (emphasis added). 
At no time prior to the termination is the employee 
informed of any procedure under which he/she can dispute 
the supersedeas. As the employee is not informed of the 
deprivation of his/her medical benefits prior to its taking 
effect, inadequate notice effectively strips an employee of 
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his/her ability or opportunity to protest or minimize 
unjustified deprivations.25 
 
In Baksalary v. Smith, 579 F. Supp. 218, 233 (E.D. Pa. 
1984), a three-judge panel of the district court held a 
similar supersedeas provision unconstitutional where it 
failed to provide notice to the employee until after the 
benefits had already been terminated. Similarly, we 
conclude that S 531(5) and (6), the supersedeas provisions 
pertaining to utilization review of medical benefits, is 
unconstitutional because it fails to provide employees with 
adequate pre-termination notice. 
 
Our invalidation of this supersedeas provision of the Act 
does not thereby annul other provisions of the Act: 
 
       Under Pennsylvania law, separate provisions of a 
       statute are presumed severable, and any particular one 
       will survive a decision voiding another unless it is so 
       interrelated with the void provision or incomplete 
       without it that the legislature could not have intended 
       it to stand alone. 
 
Stoner v. Presbyterian Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 
1979) (citing 1 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 1925). Thus, under 
our holding today we do no more than sever the "unless" 
clause from S 531(5) of the Act. We are thereby left with a 
statute that reads as follows and that requires employers or 
insurers to make payments in accordance with the 
provision of the Act, but that does not give those employers 
or insurers the discretion or opportunity to invoke the 
supersedeas of an employee's medical benefits: 
 
       The employer or insurer shall make payment and 
       providers shall submit bills and records in accordance 
       with the provisions of this section. All payments to 
       providers for treatment provided pursuant to this act 
       shall be made within thirty (30) days of receipt of such 
       bills and records. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. At oral argument, the Commonwealth conceded that no notice was 
afforded to the employees whose medical benefits were terminated 
pursuant to the supersedeas provisions at issue here. In addition, the 
Commonwealth recognized that providing notice would be "easy" to 
remedy. 
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B. Opportunity to be heard 
 
Due process requires that "an individual be given an 
opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any 
significant property interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original). The right to be 
heard " `must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.' " Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80 (quoting 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). While it is 
undisputed that some sort of hearing is required before an 
individual is finally deprived of a liberty or property 
interest, due process necessitates some sort of pre- 
termination opportunity to be heard regarding the basis of 
the proposed termination. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 
("Even decisions finding no constitutional violation in 
termination procedures have relied on the existence of some 
pre-termination opportunity to respond.") "The opportunity 
to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why 
proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due 
process requirement." Id. at 546. 
 
In the case before us, the employees were not given a 
pre-deprivation opportunity to respond to the proposed 
termination of their medical benefits. Indeed, as we have 
discussed above, they were not even given notice of the 
impending termination. "[The] right to be heard has little 
reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is 
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or 
default, acquiesce or contest." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. So, 
while the Commonwealth's statutory scheme provides that 
employees be given an opportunity for a post-termination 
evidentiary hearing in the form of a de novo hearing before 
an ALJ, we must address what pre-termination opportunity 
to be heard is required to satisfy the constitutional 
minimum of due process. 
 
In order to determine the extent of the pre-deprivation 
process, we must consider and balance the following 
factors: 
 
       First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
       official action. Second, the risk of erroneous 
       deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
       used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
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       substitute safeguards; and, finally, the government's 
       interest including the function involved and thefiscal 
       and administrative burdens that the additional or 
       substitute procedural requirements would entail. 
 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). We will 
deal with each factor in turn. 
 
(1) Private Interest 
 
The employees' interest is in the uninterrupted payment 
of their medical benefits pending the final administrative 
decision on their cases. Sullivan II at 5. As the district court 
acknowledged, this interest is "without a doubt[,] 
significant." Id. Without receiving her medical treatments, a 
concomitant of having her medical benefits paid to her 
medical provider, Sullivan alleges that she has endured 
longer periods of disability, unnecessary pain, and 
functional restriction. See Am. Compl. 
 
Notwithstanding the employees' significant interest, the 
district court found that these interests were mitigated by 
several factors. First, the district court noted that, unlike 
Goldberg, termination of one's medical benefits would not 
deprive an employee of the very means of his/her 
subsistence. See Sullivan II at 5. The district court also 
concluded that the availability of full remedies mitigates the 
impact of the supersedeas. Id. at 6. For instance, an 
employee whose medical benefits are reinstated on appeal 
by an ALJ is entitled to an award of benefits plus ten (10) 
percent interest. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 717.1(a) 
(West Supp. 1997). In addition, the prevailing employee 
may recover the costs of litigating his/her right to medical 
benefits. See id. S 996 (West Supp. 1997). 
 
Additionally, the district court noted -- and the 
Defendants contend -- that the Act does not proscribe a 
medical provider from continuing to treat an employee 
during the utilization review process. Sullivan II at 5 n.4. 
Indeed, in the amended complaint, some of the Plaintiffs 
admit to receiving some medical treatments although such 
treatments were undergoing utilization review. See, e.g., 
App. A-107 (Louis Baumgartner). Further, there is nothing 
in the statute that requires that an employee's medical 
benefits be suspended. See Sullivan II at 8. 
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Finally, the Defendants emphasize that this case is 
unlike Goldberg, Mathews, and other traditional due 
process cases because the court must not only weigh the 
private interest of Sullivan against the governmental 
interest, but must also consider the conflicting private 
interest of the insurance companies. The insurers have an 
interest in not paying for unnecessary and/or unreasonable 
medical treatment. The Defendants argue this interest is 
significant because once such treatment is paid it cannot 
be recouped from employees or their medical providers even 
if the disputed treatment is found to be unreasonable or 
unnecessary. See Moats v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal 
Bd., 588 A.2d 116, 118 (1991) ("[T]he employer may not 
seek reimbursement from the claimant or be relieved of 
paying past medical bills."). Accordingly, the district court 
held that "a full evidentiary hearing prior to a possible 
temporary suspension of benefits is not an indispensable 
requisite for the process that is due." Sullivan II at 6. 
 
The district court mischaracterized the nature of 
Sullivan's interest, and in so doing, minimized the severity 
of the deprivation at issue. The district court apparently 
viewed the medical benefits as more akin to a pecuniary 
interest, and not an interest in the relief that the medical 
treatment provides to injured employees. The remedies that 
the Act provides to an employee whose medical benefits are 
unjustly terminated provide merely superficial redress as 
they focus upon a monetary interest as distinct from a 
medical interest in one's well-being. Further, as medical 
benefits are typically terminated upon invocation of 
utilization review, the employee does not receive any 
medical treatment pending review and thus there may be 
no medical costs to reimburse upon a determination that 
the medical treatments were, in fact, reasonable and 
necessary. Once the supersedeas is invoked, it can take 
several months before the URO reaches its decision and -- 
before the reconsideration process was rescinded-- even 
longer if reconsideration review was requested. 26 Although a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Although the URO is required to render a decision within thirty (30) 
days of the receipt of the employee's medical records or sixty (60) days 
from the date of assignment, in the amended complaint, Sullivan alleges 
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monetary award may compensate an individual forfinancial 
losses, a monetary award cannot be deemed an adequate, 
effective, or appropriate substitute for relieving an 
employee's disability or pain. Nor can it be a substitute for 
necessary medical care. Hence, we are persuaded that the 
employees' private interest in receiving uninterrupted 
medical benefits is a weighty and significant factor in the 
pre-termination calculus. 
 
(2) Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
 
The district court held that the risk of erroneous 
deprivation in the instant case was slight. The utilization 
review process considers only medical reports provided 
directly by the treating physician and related specifically to 
certain questioned medical procedures and treatments; no 
independent medical reports are consulted. The reviewer is 
a physician in the same profession and with the same 
specialty as the treating physician, and the reviewer is only 
permitted to apply generally accepted medical protocols to 
determine whether the questioned treatment is reasonable 
or necessary. The district court acknowledged -- and 
Defendants argue -- that medical reports are unbiased, 
objective, and trustworthy, and thus, the problems 
associated with credibility of witnesses are not present such 
that a pre-deprivation hearing would be helpful. In 
addition, as reconsideration review has been eliminated by 
Act 57, an employee can receive a de novo evidentiary 
hearing before an ALJ more quickly than before. 27 As a 
result, the district court held that additional safeguards 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that this time frame is often not adhered to. See Am. Compl. P 66. The 
length of the deprivation here further supports our conclusion that the 
private interests are significant. See Mathews , 424 U.S. at 341 ("the 
possible length of wrongful deprivation of . . . benefits is an important 
factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private 
interests.")(internal quotations and citation omitted); see, e.g., 
Baksalary, 
579 F. Supp at 224 (stating that resolution of case typically took one 
year or more). 
 
27. Most of the Plaintiffs before us were subjected to the reconsideration 
review process as the termination of their medical benefits occurred prior 
to the amendment to the Act. See Am. Compl. PP 102, 105, 129, 163, 
181, 198, 216, 254. 
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were not necessary to protect an injured employee from 
being deprived of one's constitutionally protected property 
interest in receiving medical benefits. We disagree. 
 
Contrary to the district court's conclusions, we believe 
that the risk of erroneous deprivation is significant and that 
additional safeguards can meaningfully minimize the risk of 
wrongful termination of one's medical benefits. As we stated 
above, employees receive no notice that a supersedeas of 
their medical benefits will likely result upon the invocation 
of utilization review. They are given no pre-deprivation 
opportunity to be heard either in writing or in person; they 
are not advised of how they can protest or dispute the 
underlying allegations that their medical treatments are 
unreasonable or unnecessary. Although the employee's 
physician must be given an opportunity to discuss the 
employee's treatment, see 34 Pa. Code S 127.469, we are 
hard-pressed to believe that the portrait of the employee's 
illness and treatment is complete without a statement or 
other input from the employee himself. 
 
The district court seems to have equated the teaching of 
Mathews that an evidentiary hearing is not necessarily 
required prior to the deprivation of a constitutionally 
protected interest with the notion that no pre-termination 
process need be afforded at all. We have come to a different 
conclusion. Due process dictates that employees have some 
sort of pre-deprivation opportunity to respond before the 
supersedeas takes effect so as to guard against an 
erroneous deprivation of benefits. 
 
(3) Governmental Interest 
 
The governmental interest that must be considered is 
ensuring that only truly disabled individuals are receiving 
reasonable and necessary medical treatment. Sullivan II at 
8. The government also has an interest in containing the 
rising costs of medical care and insurance payments. 
Indeed, cost containment is the purpose behind the 
supersedeas provisions in question here. Further, the 
government has an interest in conserving its scarcefiscal 
and administrative resources, and an increase in pre- 
deprivation procedures may well be an added burden upon 
those resources. While we agree that such legitimate 
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interests exist, we are also aware that the government has 
an interest in not wrongfully depriving medical benefits to 
disabled individuals and ensuring that employees who 
reasonably and legitimately need medical care under the 
Act will continue to receive it. On balance, therefore, we are 
not convinced that any governmental interest outweighs the 
private interest we have discussed above and which favors 
Sullivan. Thus, we conclude that the denial of any pre- 
deprivation process cannot be sustained. 
 
C. What Process is Due 
 
Now that we have weighed the three factors under the 
Mathews analysis, and concluded that S 531(5) and (6) do 
not adequately suffice to protect Sullivan's due process 
interests, we must decide how much process to afford 
employees receiving medical benefits under the Act prior to 
the termination of such benefits. 
 
In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 306 (1970), 
which involved subsistence welfare benefits, has the Court 
required a full evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation. 
In contrast, in Mathews, the Court concluded that an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary before an individual 
was deprived of his/her Social Security benefits because, 
unlike the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg, the 
disability payments were less likely to be the individual's 
sole source of income. The Court held that notice of the 
proposed reasons for the termination and advice as to how 
the recipient could obtain and submit additional 
information prior to the termination was sufficient to 
comport with pre-deprivation due process procedure. 
Similarly, in Loudermill, the Supreme Court determined 
that due process required that a tenured public employee 
be given oral or written notice of the charges against 
him/her, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an 
opportunity to present her position prior to termination of 
her position. See 470 U.S. at 546. 
 
While we believe that additional procedural safeguards 
will cure the problems currently at issue with the 
supersedeas provisions, due process does not require a 
Goldberg-style evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation 
of medical benefits. Utilization review is premised upon 
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"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports," 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 
402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)), from the treating physician, 
reviewed by a physician in the same specialty who assesses 
the case based upon generally accepted medical protocols, 
principles, and practices. Issues of credibility and veracity 
are less likely to be an issue in such a case. Accordingly, 
the potential benefit of a pre-termination evidentiary 
hearing -- or even an oral presentation to the medical 
reviewer -- is substantially less in this context than in a 
Goldberg-context. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344-45. 
 
Nevertheless, we think that at a minimum the employee 
should be granted the opportunity to present additional 
evidence such as his/her personal testimony in writing as 
to the reasonableness and necessity of the disputed 
treatment, as this could significantly lessen the risk of 
erroneously depriving an employee of his/her medical 
benefits. This may be particularly true for the recipient of 
unorthodox, naturopathic, or non-traditional medical 
treatments -- such as, for example, acupuncture or 
chiropractic manipulation. Without some sort of indication 
from the very individual who is receiving the questioned 
medical treatment as to its success or the employee's 
improvement, the risk of erroneously terminating an 
employee's medical benefits is too high. 
 
We are ever mindful of the fact that the supersedeas 
provision contested in this case applies only to disabled 
workers who may experience chronic pains over the course 
of several years. Many of these workers may be disabled for 
life. The personal written submission of such disabled 
workers is critical to assessing the relative benefits that a 
particular treatment or practice might have. While reading 
medical reports and reviewing patients' charts might appear 
to show relatively slight improvement, suggesting that the 
medical treatment is unreasonable or unnecessary, a 
particular treatment might be the only medical treatment 
that alleviates an individual's pain or mitigates the severity 
of his/her symptoms. As the utilization review process 
concerns itself only with the specific medical practice that 
is being challenged, see 34 Pa. Code S 127.470, the 
reviewing physician may have little or no perspective as to 
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how a particular treatment is benefitting the patient in the 
context of the overall medical care that the employee has 
undergone during the course of his/her disability. 28 The 
opportunity for the employee to present his/her side of the 
story -- to introduce his/her own personal account as to 
how the particular treatment has ameliorated his/her 
condition -- may be highly relevant to the URO's 
determination and may not be adequately reflected or 
documented in the medical reports. 
 
Cognizant of the governmental interest, we believe that 
this additional procedural safeguard of permitting an 
employee to submit his/her personal account in writing of 
the reasonableness or necessity of the disputed medical 
treatment would not prove unduly onerous or 
administratively burdensome or costly to implement. To the 
contrary, the present procedures could remain intact but 
with the exception that the employee be notified at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (prior to the 
termination of his/her medical benefits) that he/she can 
submit, if he/she so chooses, a letter or a statement to the 
URO regarding the reasonableness or necessity of his/her 
medical treatment. The reviewing physician could then 
consider the employee's account as part of the evidence 
considered when making his/her determination. We are not 
persuaded that this type of evidence would pose a problem 
for the reviewing physician, as doctors regularly make 
judgments about the course of treatments depending upon 
the input from their patients. The reviewing physician as 
part of the utilization review process would simply consider 
the employee's account of the medical treatment before 
rendering judgment. 
 
In sum, we hold that the supersedeas provisions under 
S 531(5) and (6) violate the dictates of due process by not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. While we recognize that the regulations require that a URO attempt 
to obtain a complete set of medical records from all of an employee's 
medical providers for a particular injury, see 34 Pa. Code. S 127.462, 
there is no guarantee that all of an employee's records will be located, 
received, and reviewed during the utilization review. In any event, 
medical records provide but one component for consideration before an 
employee is deprived of his/her constitutionally protected interest in 
his/her medical benefits. 
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affording disabled employees notice or an opportunity to be 
heard before their medical benefits are suspended. To 
remedy the procedural defects in the statute, at a 
minimum, an employee must be given: (1) timely and 
reasonable notice of the imminent suspension of the 
medical benefits and treatment before the suspension takes 
effect; (2) a description of the reasons why utilization review 
has been invoked; (3) an opportunity and time to submit a 
personal statement in writing regarding the employee's view 
of the reasonableness and/or necessity of the disputed 
medical treatments; and (4) a description of the procedures 
under which the employee can appeal an adverse 
determination. 
 
V. 
 
In addition to the deficiencies we have discussed 
regarding the Commonwealth's statutes, we now consider 
whether the regulations governing utilization review provide 
adequate guidance to UROs and ALJs. We hold that they 
do. 
 
Sullivan claims that the regulations governing utilization 
review fail to provide standards for determining whether the 
contested medical treatment is reasonable or necessary. 
Without such standards, Sullivan contends that the 
decisions by the UROs and ALJs are ad hoc, arbitrary, and 
without any consistency among the various UROs or ALJs 
such that those decisions violate her right to procedural 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We cannot 
agree. 
 
The district court properly held that the regulations in 
question provide sufficient guidance to reviewing physicians 
and ALJs to comport with due process. As in any case that 
is subject to utilization review, the inquiry solely focuses 
upon whether the medical treatment in question is 
reasonable and/or necessary. See 34 Pa. CodeS 127.470. 
In so doing, the regulations provide that the reviewing 
physician must be of the same specialty as the treating 
physician, see 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann.S 531(6)(i), and that 
the reviewer must analyze the disputed treatment in light of 
generally accepted medical protocols. See 34 Pa. Code 
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S 127.467. The reviewing physician may not consider 
whether the injury being treated is work-related, whether 
the employee continues to be disabled, whether the 
employee has reached maximum medical improvement, or 
whether the fees assessed for the services provided are 
reasonable. See id. S 127.470. Furthermore, the reviewer 
must provide a detailed opinion in writing that explains the 
basis for his/her determination. See id. S 127.472. 
Accordingly, the regulations provide guidelines which serve 
to provide necessary guidance to the reviewing physician 
concerning the appropriate bases for his/her determination 
such that the ultimate determinations are not arbitrary and 
do not discriminate. 
 
Similarly, the de novo hearings before Workers' 
Compensation ALJs also comport with due process. As in 
any administrative hearing, the ALJ hears testimony, 
considers evidence, and renders decisions consistent with 
the applicable law. At these de novo hearings, an employee 
has the opportunity to present his/her own medical expert, 
the right to cross-examination of the witnesses, and the 
right to present additional evidence to support his/her 
claim. Further, the statute provides that the ALJ shall 
consider -- but is not bound by -- the report from the 
utilization review. See 77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(6)(iv). 
There is no indication that the de novo hearings in the 
utilization review context suffer from any different 
procedure or lack of guidance than any other 
administrative hearing of which we are aware. Accordingly, 
we hold that the regulations provide sufficient guidance to 
the reviewing physicians and the ALJs in evaluating 
employees' cases such that the employees' rights to 
procedural due process are honored. 
 
VI. 
 
We now address whether imposing the costs of 
reconsideration review upon a losing employee -- without 
giving him/her proper notice beforehand -- violates due 
process. 
 
Before the amendments in Act 57, if either party 
disagreed with the decision rendered by the URO, that 
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party could petition the Bureau for reconsideration review 
within thirty (30) days of receiving the decision. See 34 Pa. 
Code S 127.502(a). Unlike the initial utilization review, 
however, where the employer or insurer paid for the review, 
the Bureau advanced the costs of reconsideration review 
and charged the losing party for the cost thereafter. While 
Act 57 eliminated reconsideration review, Act 57 did not 
become effective until August 23, 1996, nearly three 
months after the amended complaint in this action was 
filed. Thus, most of the Plaintiffs before us were subjected 
to the costs of reconsideration review when they suffered an 
adverse decision upon reconsideration. It is unclear from 
the undeveloped record below, however, whether any of the 
Plaintiffs actually paid these reconsideration fees. 
 
Sullivan contends that the imposition of a fee upon a 
losing employee violated an employee's right to due process 
because such a fee was imposed without any notice, 
without an opportunity to be heard on the underlying 
contested claim, and without any consideration for the 
employee's ability to pay. There was no in forma pauperis 
status for reconsideration. Sullivan further asserts that 
such a scheme violated the liberty interests of employees 
because one may have foregone reconsideration review 
rather than risk paying the substantial costs of 
reconsideration if he/she lost.29 
 
We do not decide whether the imposition of costs on 
reconsideration without notice violated the dictates of due 
process. As the Act has been amended, reconsideration 
review no longer exists, these fees are no longer imposed, 
and thus, this is not a continuing problem. Further, given 
the undeveloped record, we cannot determine whether any 
of the Plaintiffs, in fact, paid these fees. Accordingly, we 
remand to the district court to determine whether any of 
the Plaintiffs paid the costs of reconsideration, what those 
costs were, and to re-examine the possible constitutional 
difficulties that the imposition of reconsideration fees poses. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. The costs of reconsideration review varies. The typical charge is 
several hundred dollars. See Am. Compl. P 77. 
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VII. 
 
At this juncture, we raise an Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity issue sua sponte as it is relevant to our 
jurisdiction over the Commonwealth Defendants. See V-1 
Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 
1419 (10th Cir. 1997) (raising Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity sua sponte); Suarez Corp. Indus. v. 
McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997) ("We believe 
that, because of its jurisdictional nature, a court ought to 
consider the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity at any 
time, even sua sponte."); Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust 
v. Goggins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (raising Eleventh 
Amendment issue sua sponte); Charley's Taxi Radio 
Dispatch Corp. v. Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); but see Bouchard Transp. Co. v. 
Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (stating that the "Eleventh Amendment is not 
jurisdictional in the sense that courts must address the 
issue sua sponte"). 
 
The Eleventh Amendment30 confers sovereign immunity 
upon the States such that they cannot be subject to suit in 
district court absent either Congressional intent to abrogate 
that immunity enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of 
power, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, #6D 6D6D# U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 
1114, 1123 (1996), or a State's explicit consent. See Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 
(1990). The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not 
immunize State officials for actions taken in their individual 
capacities. See Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 
(1974). 
 
The amended complaint does not make clear whether the 
Plaintiffs have brought suit against the Commonwealth 
Defendants in their official or individual capacities, or both. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
 
       The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
       extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
       against one of United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
       Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
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We leave this for the district court to decide. If the district 
court determines that the Commonwealth Defendants have 
only been sued in their official capacities, the district court 
-- in its discretion -- may allow the Plaintiffs to amend 
their complaint to include those Defendants in their 
individual capacities. In any event, the district court will be 
obliged to address whether redress can be sought against 
the Commonwealth Defendants in federal court under 
Eleventh Amendment proscriptions. 
 
VIII. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that the supersedeas provisions of 
77 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 531(5) and (6), are 
unconstitutional in that they violate an employee's 
procedural due process rights by failing to provide adequate 
notice that his/her medical benefits may be suspended 
upon the invocation of utilization review and by not 
granting the employee an opportunity to respond in writing 
before that termination takes effect. We also hold that the 
private insurance companies are state actors and thus may 
be joined in a S 1983 action when they elect to invoke the 
supersedeas provisions to terminate or suspend an 
employee's constitutionally protected interests in receiving 
medical benefits. 
 
Thus, we will reverse the order of the district court 
dismissing Sullivan's complaint and will remand to the 
district court for further proceedings in accordance with 
this opinion. On remand, among other issues, the district 
court should address the issue of reconsideration fees, the 
question of certifying a class, and for the first time, it 
should consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Commonwealth Defendants in light of Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity. 
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